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Abstract
This study investigates the heterogeneity of European NUTS-2 regions with regard
to their ability to take advantage of European Union (EU) structural funds aimed
at convergence. It considers a concept of absorptive capacity based on regional pol-
icy design, and additionally accounts for the programming period 2007-2013 in the
empirical analysis. A fuzzy regression discontinuity design allowing for heterogeneous
treatment effects is applied to evaluate convergence funds in 250 NUTS-2 regions from
2000 (and 1989) to 2013. The main results suggest a positive conditional impact of
funds payments on regional GDP per capita growth. However, based on a time-varying
treatment effects model, we are able to identify a deterioration in the effectiveness of
convergence funds during the programming period 2007-2013. Furthermore, the analy-
sis reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship between the share of committed funds
paid out and GDP per capita growth. The latter finding indicates that the marginal
benefits from EU convergence funds might be decreasing.
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1 Introduction
The developments since the economic and financial crisis and the European debt crisis have
highlighted the heterogeneity of the member states and regions of the European Union
(EU). However, achieving income convergence of European regions in terms of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita has been on the agenda of the European institutions since
the 1980’s. With the multi-annual financial framework (MFF) 2007-2013, the expenditure
towards fostering competitiveness and cohesion for growth and employment has become
the biggest item in the EU budget. With that, the European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) conducts funding programs that
provide transfers with which regional administrative authorities perform projects aimed
at different objectives. The main regional policy instruments are the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), together often called struc-
tural funds, and the Cohesion Fund (CF).1 A major part of these funds, which we will refer
to as convergence funds or former Objective 1 funds in this paper, is allocated to the rel-
atively weakest regions, i.e., regions with a GDP per capita below 75 % of the EU average.2
Despite the importance of regional redistribution and cohesion, evaluations of the effective-
ness of convergence funds point to different results across regions. Following the academic
and political debate on the absorption of structural funds (e.g., Katsarova 2013, Healy and
Bristow 2013, Tosun 2014, Tătulescu and Pătruţi 2014), two issues are expected to be cru-
cial: Firstly, not all of the funds committed to the weakest regions at the beginning of the
program period are actually paid out and, hence, used for convergence projects. Potential
explanations for this phenomenon include that i) each project needs to be co-financed by
the member state and the particular region, respectively, and ii) the administrative effort
is high as detailed and profound operational programs, project and budget plans need to
be provided by the region in order to receive the funds. Secondly, the effectiveness and
likely success of funds that are paid out for projects might vary. Among the probable
reasons discussed in the literature are regional absorptive capacity or regional structural
characteristics such as human capital endowments.3 From an institutional point of view,
the success of structural funds projects may also depend on their quality of planning and
implementation.
1There are two further regional funds, namely, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGG-F) and a Financial Instrument for Fisheries (FIF). The European Commission refers to the
regional funds up from 2007-2013 as European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).
2Up to the EU’s multi-annual financial framework 2000-2006, in line with which regional policy programs
are organized, they have been called Objective 1 regions, thereafter the objectives were restructured and
renamed. The funding programs have been designed for the periods 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2006,
2007-2013, and, now, 2014-2020. The regions in question in this research are on the NUTS-2 level following
the Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques 2010 (NUTS 2010) (UNESCO 2006).
3The absorptive capacity of regions has been shown to be a relevant factor for the effectiveness of regional
transfers like EU structural funds (see, among others, Becker, Egger and von Ehrlich 2013, Rodríguez-Pose
2013, Bachtler, Mendez and Oraže 2014).
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Another issue related to the likely effectiveness of regional policies today is the economic
downturn following the financial crisis and the European debt crisis. Camagni and Capello
(2015) treat the topic of EU cohesion policies during the Great Recession and claim that
structural, long-term projects are more difficult to conduct due to financial and political
reasons. Having a look at the shares of funds available to the regions (committed funds)
that are actually paid out for projects, its (national) average reduces from 98.2 % in 2000-
2006 to only 62.09 % in 2007-2013. This implies that, indeed, the incentives to implement
already agreed regional policy projects is relatively low in the latter period.
This paper investigates the heterogeneity of European NUTS-2 regions in their ability to
take advantage of European structural funds, such that the regions’ income per capita
increases over the programming period. Its contributions are twofold: Firstly, the ab-
sorptive capacity concept used in this paper is motivated by the regional funds allocation
procedure in practice, i.e., the focus lies on describing the capability of regional authorities
and beneficiaries to reach the projects’ goal of increased regional growth. Therefore, the
definition of absorptive capacity is broadened by considering not only the share of the
labour force with high education but their employment status.4 The underlying hypothe-
sis to be tested empirically is that a higher education level in a region may only be able to
contribute to using European support effectively when it is employed (used productively).
This is motivated by the observation that, since 2008, employment rates of graduates and
people with upper secondary education are stagnating while the number of people attain-
ing these levels of education is steadily increasing.5
Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper taking the full multi-annual
financial framework 2007-2013 which coincides with the Great Recession into account for
assessing the effectiveness of structural funds in a pan-European setting. Besides imple-
menting a time-varying feature of the treatment effect, we further investigate the role of
decreasing usage of available funds for the effectiveness of EU’s regional policy measures.
Therefore, the share of committed funds actually paid out is used for modeling treatment
intensity in the particular programming periods.
The empirical analysis follows Becker et al. (2013) who apply a regression discontinuity
design to estimate heterogeneous local average treatment effects of Objective 1 structural
4According to the literature on foreign direct investments and other (regional) transfers, the education of
the labour force, the size of the research & development (R&D) sector as well as institutional quality are
broadly accepted determinants of a region’s absorptive capacity and, analogously, its growth potential
(Becker et al. 2013, Nguyen, Duysters, Patterson and Sander 2009, Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
5The high unemployment rates, even among the population with upper secondary and higher education, in
most European countries are not expected to decrease in the short or medium term, and rising long-term
and youth unemployment will deepen the problem further (see, e.g., OECD 2014). Unemployment has
crucial effects on the budgetary stability and budget formulation of the countries. Therefore, it gets even
more relevant in the context of the European debt crisis and the implemented policy measures.
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funds for the regional policy programming periods from 1989-1993 to 2000-2006.6 This
approach is used to evaluate the implications of absorptive capacity, modeled by the em-
ployment rates of the highly educated labour force of a region, institutional quality and
the size of R&D expenditure in a region, on the success of structural funds aimed at con-
vergence and, therefore, the European institutions’ power to actually support convergence
of the regions. Including the multi-annual financial period 2007-2013 into the analysis
allows to assess the effectiveness of the EU’s regional policy in the crisis period.7
Summing up the main findings, conditional on regional absorptive capacity and the re-
spective programming period, convergence funds appear to have a positive and significant
impact on regional GDP per capita growth across the programming periods. Better in-
stitutional quality appears to consistently improve GDP per capita growth. However,
compared to former periods, the effectiveness of convergence funds significantly deterio-
rates in the crisis period 2007-2013. Examining this issue in more detail by taking the
regional share of committed funds paid out into account suggests that there is an in-
verted U-shaped relationship between treatment intensity and GDP per capita growth in
a period. This implies that the GDP per capita growth effect of an additional Euro of
convergence funds paid out decreases with the amount already spent (even in a period of
economic downturn). The results from several robustness checks like a sharp regression
discontinuity design or controlling for spatial dependence of the treatment support these
findings.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 treats EU regional policy and its
varying effectiveness, discussing the policy design and previous literature on absorptive
capacity as well as regional policy in crises. Section 3 motivates the model and Section 4
sketches the regression framework. Section 5 provides details on the data. Section 6 shows
the estimation results and, finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 EU Regional Policy and its Effectiveness
The EU’s regional policy has become the biggest budget item in EU budgets since 2007.
In the multi-annual financial framework 2007-2013, the expenses for competitiveness for
growth and jobs (9.25 %) and for economic social, economic and territorial cohesion
(35.75 % of total commitments) exceeded the expenses for the common agricultural policy
(42.29 %) (European Commission 2015d). Alike, 13.13 % of the EU commitments for the
period 2014-2020 are allocated to promoting competitiveness for growth and jobs, and
6Becker et al. (2013) have used the education of the workforce (share of workers with at least upper
secondary education) and a quality of government index as indicators for the absorptive capacity of a
region.
7Due to data availability of pre-treatment variables as well as structural funds commitments and payments,
the main results presented in this paper consider the multi-annual financial frameworks (MFFs) 2000-2006
and 2007-2013. Further estimation results taking into account also the programming periods 1989-1993
and 1994-1999 are provided in the appendix.
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33.88 % for economic social, social and territorial cohesion, while the share of the common
agricultural policy diminishes further to 38.80 % of the EU budget (European Commis-
sion 2015e). Thus, currently, its regional policy is the EU’s most important redistributive
policy instrument for promoting economic growth and supporting the convergence of Eu-
ropean regions.
Basically, regional funds are allocated according to the following objectives: i) Convergence
(former Objective 1), ii) regional competitiveness and employment (comparable to former
Objective 2) and iii) European territorial cooperation (comparable to former Objective 3).
Contrarily to the second and third target, the eligibility of regions for convergence funds is
clearly regulated as this type of funds is available for the relatively weakest regions with a
GDP per capita below 75 % of the EU average.8 The committed ERDF and ESF transfers
to the lagging regions amounted to about 137 billions for 2000-2006, in 2007-2013 to over
214 billions of Euros. These numbers mean a share of convergence or former Objective 1
funds of all ERDF and ESF payments of 70.32 % in 2000-2006 or rather 77.28 % in 2007-
2013 (European Commission 2015c). Therefore, analyzing these parts of regional funds is
likely to allow a proper picture on the effectiveness of EU regional policy.
2.1 The Varying Effectiveness of EU Regional Policy
There are several studies evaluating the EU’s regional policy, however, with mixed em-
pirical evidence (see, e.g., Sala-i Martin 1996, Boldrin and Canova 2001, Rodríguez-Pose
and Fratesi 2004, Dall’Erba, Le Gallo et al. 2007, Dall’Erba and Le Gallo 2008, Ramajo,
Márquez, Hewings and Salinas 2008, Esposti and Bussoletti 2008, Becker et al. 2013, Pel-
legrini, Terribile, Tarola, Muccigrosso and Busillo 2013, and, up to our knowledge most
recently, Barone, David and de Blasio 2016, Ferrara, McCann, Pellegrini, Stelder and Ter-
ribile 2016 and Breidenbach, Mitze and Schmidt 2016). Most studies find a positive, but
often very small effect of the regional transfers while others find none or even a negative
impact on convergence. Moreover, statistical significance varies. One reason may be that,
on the one hand, the analyses vary in terms of considered time periods, definitions of struc-
tural funds receipt and data on the national or regional level. On the other hand, they
use different estimation approaches and methods. Methodologies used reach from mani-
fold econometric studies and macroeconomic simulations (of the potential of the support
of specific regions) to micro-level and case studies (see Hagen and Mohl 2009 for a survey).
In order to estimate the conditional convergence of regions in income levels or economic
growth, various authors have analyzed (mostly on country level) under which circum-
stances the structural funds and Cohesion Fund are more effective in promoting conver-
gence. Variables which are expected to influence the consequences of regional transfers are
8Furthermore, this type of funds is directed to regions which are geographically isolated or, e.g., face severe
challenges, e.g. Northern Ireland. Note that, having a deeper look at actual expenditure data, also a few
regions which would not be eligible have received payments (see Section 3).
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human capital (the share of workers with high education, as in Becker et al. 2013), institu-
tional quality (e.g., Rodríguez-Pose 2013), the degree of decentralization of administration
(Tosun 2014), corruption, the size of the R&D sector (expenditure) or openness to trade
(Hagen and Mohl 2009). Further literature treats the relatively new concept of territorial
capital (Camagni 2008) and its implications for regional policy (Fratesi and Perucca 2014).
In this paper, another potential source for variation in the effectiveness of regional policy is
examined. Up to our knowledge, no study has included the full crisis period 2007-2013 in a
pan-European setting into a microeconometric evaluation framework yet. Related research
is provided by Camagni and Capello (2015) who conduct an interesting analysis of regional
divergence triggered by the economic crisis and the role of regional policy, and Ciani and
De Blasio 2015 investigating the impact of structural funds in the crisis in Southern Italy.
The empirical results of this paper contribute the finding that, intuitively not surprisingly,
the effectiveness of regional policy declines significantly in 2007-2013 relative to previous
periods.
2.2 The Design of EU Regional Policy and its Implications on the Ab-
sorptive Capacity for Structural Funds
As indicated in the introduction, it is probable that the design of the EU’s regional policy
influences the effectiveness of the funds assignment. In general, the European Commission
and national managing authorities approve operational programs which motivate projects
and how they may contribute to a particular objective.9 There are two issues that are
likely to affect the regions’ success in thoroughly implementing their planned projects:
Firstly, each project needs to be co-financed by public funds of the member state and,
partly, the recipient itself, which limits the regions’ ability to actually call transfers (get
them paid out) that would be available for them (have been committed). Secondly, set-
ting up and implementing these programs requires much ongoing administrative effort and
project planning expertise of public authorities and the beneficiaries, and might make it
hard to access the funds especially for new member states. Both points indicate that not
all countries and regions indeed receive the amount of transfers that was committed to
them, which is proven to be true in the data.
Table 1 shows the national shares of committed transfers at the beginning of the program
periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013, respectively, that were paid out (in literature sometimes
referred to as absorption rates). There seems to be some variation across countries in their
usage of committed funds in 2000-2006. However, what becomes immediately apparent,
is that the shares decrease tremendously for the years 2007-2013, especially considering
payments until 2013, the end of the actual budget period. Considering not only funds
9Either, these operational programs correspond to one (NUTS-2) region and an objective (like convergence)
or they summarize projects targeting at areas of strategic importance (like transport or environment) on
the national level.
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aimed at convergence and Objective 1 funds, respectively, but structural funds assigned
to all of the three main objectives, yields a similar picture. Their shares actually paid out
are shown in column 4 of Table 1, with an average share of only 64.10 %. Regions are
allowed to call committed funds until two years after the programming period but still,
for 2007-2013, the share paid out until 2015 (last column of Table 1) indicates that the
total amount of available funds has not been used in any country. As an extreme case,
Croatia has only received 50.65 % of the committed funds.
Table 1: Share of committed convergence (Objective 1) funds actually paid out in EU
member states in MFFs 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 (excl. payments in years af-
terwards)
Member State 2000-2006 2007-2013 2007-2013 2007-13 - Status 2015
ERDF & ESF ERDF & ESF ERDF & ESF ERDF & ESF
Convergence Convergence All objectives All objectives
Belgium 99.21% 57.22% 68.80% 93.05%
Cyprus - - 66.35% 95.00%
Czech Republic 99.29% 48.73% 55.00% 87.40%
Denmark - - 54.40% 95.00%
Germany 98.38% 70.45% 71.45% 92.50%
Estonia 99.90% 83.40% 84.45% 95.00%
Greece 99.28% 64.57% 65.65% 97.00%
Spain 97.11% 57.22% 62.55% 80.40%
France 98.29% 55.02% 59.90% 92.20%
Ireland 97.20% - 70.10% 90.00%
Italy 93.14% 49.00% 54.55% 82.65%
Latvia 100.00% 78.60% 79.05% 95.00%
Lithuania 100.00% 79.39% 79.20% 95.00%
Luxembourg - - 67.80% 95.00%
Hungary 99.84% 57.26% 60.50% 84.35%
Malta 100.00% 45.55% 51.55% 82.10%
Netherlands 100.00% - 63.85% 91.15%
Austria 99.97% 71.81% 70.55% 93.35%
Poland 99.81% 70.76% 71.80% 94.85%
Portugal 102.57% 80.36% 80.45% 95.00%
Slovenia 100.00% 72.71% 73.45% 95.00%
Slovakia 96.58% 51.42% 52.90% 87.30%
Finland 100.00% - 76.25% 95.00%
Sweden 100.00% - 67.50% 94.75%
United Kingdom 98.39% 62.58% 57.30% 87.95%
EU-25 98.20 %
Bulgaria 52.57% 55.10% 89.85%
Romania 38.62% 39.10% 66.55%
Croatia 0.00% 11.50% 50.65%
EU-28 62.09 % 64.10 % 88.60 %
Data source: European Commission. 2000-2006, 2007-2013 (convergence funds): European Commission (2015c); 2007-2013 (all
objectives): European Commission (2016b)
In practice, private and public companies and institutions, research institutes, non-governmental
organization, clusters, networks, etc. apply for project support, and the responsible re-
gional administrative authority allocates them to an appropriate operational program.
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This procedure entails a high administrative effort for regional (and national) administra-
tion and the potential beneficiaries. Thus, getting one step further, a region’s potential to
provide comprehensive, well-planned operational programs and implement the prepared
projects depends on two characteristics which have been assumed to be crucial for regional
absorptive capacity in previous literature (see Section 1): Firstly, institutional quality and
corruption are important indicators for the ability of regions to effectively and efficiently
prepare operational programs including the choice of convenient projects. Secondly, in
the end firms, public and private institutions, etc. propose projects, receive payments and
realize the projects aimed at regional convergence. Therefore, we will test the hypothesis
that the employment rate of the workforce with high education may matter for regional
policy effectiveness as a larger share of regional workers with high education might be
more capable to design and carry out successful project ideas. Finally, companies that
invest more in R&D may be associated with a higher probability of proposing promising
projects. Therefore, the R&D expenditure of companies and entities in all sectors is con-
sidered as a further variable contributing to the absorptive capacity of regions.10
In the remainder of this study, we investigate the effectiveness of structural funds (ERDF
and ESF) allocated to the convergence objective. It will be examined whether the het-
erogeneity of European regions in terms of their absorptive capacity, modeled by the
indicators introduced above, affects the success of regional policy.
2.2.1 Absorptive Capacity and Employment
The concept of absorptive capacity of a country or region for external funds has been
widely discussed in literature regarding foreign direct investments (FDI). Nguyen et al.
(2009) have emphasized that there are principally two stages of absorption of FDI in an
economy: the ability and possibility to implement FDI projects and, in a second step, to
absorb the technology or other benefits from FDI into own competencies. Crucial factors
for the absorptive capacity that have been discussed in the literature are the technology
of the country receiving FDI, the education of the labour force, the extent and quality of
the country’s research and development sector, the development of the financial sector, as
well as the institutional system (De Mello Jr 1997, Blomström and Kokko 2003, Cohen
and Levinthal 1990, Fu 2008, Hermes and Lensink 2003, Kalotay 2000, Durham 2004).
Nguyen et al. (2009) group these characteristics into the absorptive capacity of the recip-
ient country’s firms, comprising the technological development and the education level of
workers, and national absorptive capacity. The latter is driven by the technological level,
10Given the variety of variables that have been assumed to influence the outcome of regional policy as
absorptive capacity or territorial capital, this paper focuses on the execution of regional policy in practice.
Thus, two variables corresponding to the final beneficiaries of the transfers (employed share of the labour
force with upper secondary and higher education, and R&D expenditure by companies, the public sector,
universities and nonprofit organizations) and one representing the regional authorities’ capability of
organizing the projects in an effective way are chosen (institutional quality with a focus on corruption).
Still, this choice does not mean that further concepts like territorial capital may not be important for
the effectiveness of structural funds.
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next to human capacity (population size) and the financial and institutional system.
There is relatively little literature concerning the absorptive capacity of the EU’s regional
transfers. Tosun (2014) has referred to the Europeanization literature, e.g., Bachtler et al.
(2014), which treats the implementation of EU policies on the national level, as the first
stream of literature changing the focus from the eligibility to EU structural funds alone
to the way of their usage. Zaman and Georgescu (2009) have analyzed the situation in
Romania as regards the structural funds absorption rate. They indicate that the rate is
mainly determined by institutional variables: i) the financial capacity to co-finance the
structural funds projects across the whole programming period and ii) the national and
regional administrative capacity for preparing efficient project plans and coordinating the
participants. There are various country studies on absorption rates, e.g., Milio (2007) and
Bachtler et al. (2014), likewise, from a multinational perspective, Tosun (2014) has empir-
ically shown that the administrative capacity of a country or region affects the absorption
of ERDF funds for the period 2000-2006.
Various studies have analyzed the impact of the educational distribution on funds effective-
ness. However, employment rates of people with upper secondary and tertiary education
have decreased over the last decades and especially since 2008 (OECD 2006, 2014). Fig-
ures 1 and 2 show rising shares of high education but decreasing employment rates of the
workforce having attained upper secondary or higher education. Next to the hypothesis
that better educated workers might be able to plan and implement regional projects more
effectively, these numbers are another reason why the employment rates of the labour force
with upper secondary and higher education (ISCED levels 3 and higher) are likely to be
relevant for the regional absorptive capacity for convergence funds.11 12
2.3 European Regional Policy During the Economic and Financial Crisis
In the past section, we have referred to an important issue in the process of structural
funds allocation that seems to be influenced by the Great Recession. As shown in Table 1,
there is a sharp fall in the share of committed funds paid out in the regional policy pro-
gramming period 2007-2013 relative to the previous period. Camagni and Capello (2015)
offer an intuitive explanation for that, namely, that it is more difficult for politicians to
uphold expenditure targeted at longer-term objectives, like structural funds projects, in
11For the measurement of the education level, the International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED 2011) by UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) is used. Level 0: Early childhood educational
development, pre-primary education; Level 1: Primary education; Level 2: Lower secondary education
(general, vocational); Level 3: Upper secondary education (general, vocational); Level 4: Post-secondary
non-tertiary education (general, vocational); Level 5: Short-cycle tertiary education (general, vocational);
Level 6: Bachelor’s or equivalent level; Level 7: Master’s or equivalent level; Level 8: Doctor or equivalent
level.
12To look at the productive share of the labour force with upper secondary and higher education from a
different angle, it can also be interpreted as structural characteristic of a region in the sense that it is able
to employ the produced human capital. A higher value in a region may imply that there are enough jobs
(or public services) requiring high educated labour which points to a well-developed sectoral structure.
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periods when public budget balances need to be strengthened. The authors claim that the
current crisis period could threaten the efforts towards cohesion across European regions
in the past two decades.
Figure 1: Employment rates of labour force with at least upper secondary education (ISCED
level 3 and higher)
Figure 2: Share of population aged between 25 and 64 with at least upper secondary
education (ISCED level 3 and higher) and their employment rate
Data source: Eurostat. Considered ISCED levels are level 3 and higher. 250 NUTS-2 regions of EU-25 from 2000 to 2013 (104 of
3500 observations missing). Due to data limitations (employment rate per education level, which is one main variable of interest),
the four French overseas-departments and two Portuguese regions (Acores and Madeira) are skipped.
As response to the crisis, the European institutions have installed an European economic
recovery plan with two key goals in 2008: i) restoring demand and confidence in the econ-
omy, and ii) preparing the recovery of European competitiveness in the long term by an
adjustment of investment priorities towards, beside others, smart specialization and green
energy (Commission of the European Communities 2008). One of the mitigation mea-
sures in this plan is increasing the speed of structural funds implementation by providing
9
extra funds in advance of project exertion and facilitating administrative procedures and
the implementation of projects with high priority (European Commission 2008). In 2010,
the European Commission published a report in which it the assesses the adaptations
of cohesion policy in the course of the European economic recovery plan. Certain mea-
sures like more flexibility in the payment of committed funds (advance and intermediate)
and co-financing as well as the modification of operational programs are listed as having
been adopted relatively quickly (European Commission 2010). According to the share of
available funds actually paid out in the whole programming period 2007-2013, the mit-
igation measures do not seem to have achieved a full implementation of all agreed projects.
To the best of our knowledge, so far there has been no evaluation of regional policy con-
sidering the whole programming period 2007-2013 for all regions of the European Union.
Ciani and De Blasio (2015) analyze structural funds payments between 2007 and 2013
on the local level in Southern Italy and find that the additional resources made available
by the European Commission in order to respond to the crisis were not able to outweigh
the worsening of the economic situation. Turning into the same direction, the results
presented in Section 6 show that the initiatives undertaken by the European institutions
could not ensure the same effectiveness of the execution of regional policy projects during
the crisis as in former periods.
3 The Assignment of Convergence Funds and the Hetero-
geneity of the Treatment
The empirical analysis follows Becker et al. (2013) who have used a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) for the evaluation of EU convergence funds. Adding interaction variables to
the model allows estimating a heterogeneous local average treatment effect (HLATE) that
varies with regional characteristics. The RDD identification is based on a non-random
treatment assignment in a way that the eligibility of individuals (regions in our case) for
treatment depends on some threshold in a so-called forcing variable. In this way, it offers
the advantage of ensuring a treatment assignment to observations around this threshold
that is as good as random.13 In the following, the assignment procedure of convergence
funds which gives rise to a regression discontinuity design is outlined. The estimation of
the heterogeneous local average treatment effects is described in Section 4.
13See, e.g., Lee and Lemieux (2010) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a comprehensive discussion of
regression discontinuity designs.
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3.1 The Assignment Procedure as Forcing Variable
The convergence target (former Objective 1) captures the least developed regions, namely
those with a GDP per capita below 75 % of the EU average.14 Regions that would have
been eligible before enlargements of the European Union (especially before the entrance
of ten new member states in 2004) but succeed the threshold due to the contracting effect
on the EU average GDP per capita can still receive convergence funds. Moreover, geo-
graphically remote regions, like the four French overseas regions Guadeloupe, Martinique,
Guyane and Reunion, as well as regions facing severe social problems, e.g., the conflict in
Northern Ireland, are eligible to convergence funds.
Having a look at data on structural funds allocation reveals that the discontinuity in the
eligibility criterion (forcing variable), i.e., the 75 % threshold of the average GDP per
capita in respective years, does not match exactly with the actually treated and non-
treated regions per programming period.15 In order to keep regions which do not comply
with the treatment rule in one or more programming periods, a fuzzy RDD is applied that
employs the eligibility rule as an instrument for actual treatment. Regardless of whether
a fuzzy or sharp design is used, regional GDP per capita in corresponding years is the
forcing variable determining the probability of treatment or treatment itself. Referring to
data in past years (e.g., 2000-2002 average for treatment eligibility in 2007-2013) ensures
that the outcome variable (GDP per capita growth in the program years) is independent
of the forcing variable (Becker et al. 2013).
In this study, the effectiveness of convergence funds actually paid out (not only assigned
according to EU regulations) is analyzed. As shown in Figure 3, in the multi-annual fi-
nancial framework 2000 to 2006, 67 regions (in total 250 regions in EU-25 countries are
considered) have a GDP per capita below the threshold value of 75 % of the EU-25 average
from 1994 to 1996. 66 of them have received convergence funds (have been treated), while
Bratislava, a Slovak region, should have been treated according to its GDP per capita
level but has not got funds paid out. Moreover, 39 regions should not have received funds
according to the treatment rule but did.
14The relevant average for the programming period 2007-2013 is the EU-25 average of GDP per capita
in the years 2000 to 2002, for the period 2000-2006 the EU-25 average for the years 1994-1996, for the
period 1994-1999 the EU-15 average for 1988-1990, and for the MFF 1989-1993 the EU-12 average for
1984-86 (European Council 1988, 1993, 1999, 2006).
15The following amendments to the basic eligibility criterion defined in Council Regulations 1260/1999
point into this direction: Firstly, regions with a remote spatial location, relatively very low population
density, Northern Ireland due to societal challenges, as well as transition from previous Objective 1 regions
are supported. Secondly, the Commission decision in European Commission (1999) does not include the
Eastern European countries that were to access the EU in 2004. However, the final regional expenditure
study in SWECO (2008), that is provided on the DG REGIO website, shows that all Estonian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Maltese, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, Slovenian and Slovakian NUTS-2 regions have received
Objective 1 structural funds from the European Regional Development Fund and European Social Fund.
Therefore, the ten countries that have become member states of the EU in 2004 are included in our
sample.
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Figure 3: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita 1994-1996) and the actual assignment of convergence funds in 2000-2006
Figure 4: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita 2000-2002) and the actual assignment of convergence funds in 2007-2013
Data source: DG Regional Policy, Eurostat. Data for EU-25 on NUTS-2 level (250 regions), excluding
Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. The four French overseas departments Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyane
and Reunion and two Portuguese regions Acores and Madeira are excluded due to a lack of data. The
upper graph includes five observations (treated although their forcing variable lies above 1.25) that are
excluded in the empirical analysis.
To mention a rather extreme case, Stockholm has received convergence payments in 2000-
2006 although its GDP per capita has been nearly twice as high as the EU average in
1994-1996, which may bias results. Therefore, extreme outliers, namely regions with a
GDP per capita in the corresponding threshold years equal to or higher than 1.25 times
the EU average (five observations in 2000-2006) and below one quarter of the EU average
(no observations) are excluded in the empirical analysis.16
16As robustness check, a sharp regression discontinuity design is estimated that excludes non-compliers
with the treatment rule and uses a GDP per capita below 75 % of the EU average (in corresponding
years) as clear indicator for treatment.
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For the programming period from 2007 to 2013, there are 66 regions (of 250), whose GDP
per capita averaged over the years 2000 to 2002 is lower than the EU-25 average for the
same period (see Figure 4). Only 64 of these 66 regions have actually received structural
funds payment (Bratislava and one region each in Hungary are the exceptions). Again,
note that 18 regions have been treated although they have not met the treatment rule,
i.e., the forcing variable does not lie below 75 % of the EU-25 average. One reason is that
regions that have been treated as Objective 1 regions before, are part of a phasing out
program in order to finalize projects and achieve targets set. In this period, there are no
outliers as defined above for 2000-2006.
This leads to the treatment rule used for the estimation of the local average treatment effect
(LATE) which is a deterministic function of the forcing variable in the sharp design. In
the fuzzy design, the treatment rule serves as an instrument for actual treatment status:17
Ti = 1(xi ≤ x0) (1)
where Ti is a binary variable indicating treatment or non-treatment of a region i and x0
is the EU-25 average of GDP per capita in the years 1994 to 1996 (for MFF 2000-2006)
and 2000 to 2002, respectively (for MFF 2007-2013).
The aim of this research is to estimate the local average treatment effect of the treatment
defined above on GDP per capita growth (of the treated regions). In the baseline results,
the dependent variable is average GDP per capita growth per programming period, i.e.,
the mean of GDP per capita growth rates from 2000 to 2006 and 2007 to 2012 (following
Becker et al. 2013).18 Table 2 shows that mean outcomes are statistically significantly
different from each other in regions that received convergence funds and those that did
not.19 In treated regions, average GDP per capita growth turns out higher than in non-
treated regions, which supports the convergence argument that relatively weaker regions
grow faster than more developed regions, probably also triggered by the structural funds
allocation. The only exception is when considering the budget period 2007-2013 which
coincides with the economic and financial crisis. Here, there is no statistically significant
difference in growth rates which seem to fall in general. That may imply that the process
of decreasing divergence between regions, i.e., the catching-up of the relatively weakest
regions, has been disrupted (see also Camagni and Capello 2015).
17See, beside others, Angrist and Pischke (2009) or Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details on the econo-
metric framework.
182013 data on GDP per capita is not available neither from Cambridge Econometrics nor from Eurostat.
19For the years 1989-1999, those regions are considered as treated that are mentioned in corresponding EU
regulations as Objective 1 funds recipients. For consequent years, data of actual payments (not only the
lists of regions in EU regulations) is adopted.
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Table 2: Mean outcome comparison between regions that did and did not receive payments
Actual transfers (2000-2013) and EU Regulations (1989-1999)
Mean Ti = 1 Mean Ti = 0 Difference Obs.
1989-1993
Outcome 0.017 0.015 −0.002∗∗ 890
1994-1999
Outcome 0.027 0.026 −0.002∗ 1248
2000-2006
Outcome 0.029 0.017 −0.012∗∗∗ 1750
2007-2013
Outcome 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 1750
2000-2013
Outcome 0.017 0.008 −0.009∗∗∗ 3500
Data: Cambridge Econometrics (transformed to NUTS-2010 classification), DG Regional Policy, EU Commission. The four French
overseas departments and two Portuguese regions are not included in the dataset.
3.2 The Heterogeneity of the Treatment Effect
Having these insights on the treatment outcome in mind, we can now turn to the hetero-
geneity of the treatment effect that is dependent on regional characteristics. We are not
only interested in the treatment effect but in its conditionality on the absorptive capacity
of a region and the time period, as the last one, 2007-2013, is characterized by an economic
downturn in whole Europe. As discussed in Section 2, we would like to test whether the
share of labour force with upper secondary and higher education that is in employment,
institutional quality as well as R&D expenditure in a region have an impact on the extent
of the treatment effect. For the correct identification of the model, it is necessary to con-
sider pre-treatment observations of these variables such that it is ensured that they are
not themselves influenced by the treatment. Consequently, an essential requirement for
estimating the local average treatment effect (LATE) is that the pre-treatment covariates
are not discontinuous at the 75 % threshold of the forcing variable. The corresponding
graphs controlling for this issue are provided in the appendix. In this study, data in 2000
(as 1999 data is not available) and 2006 are chosen as pre-treatment variables for 2000-
2006 and 2007-2013, respectively.20 These regional characteristics enter the regression as
separate term as well as in interaction with the treatment and are modeled as deviation
from their respective sample mean.
For the evaluation of convergence funds in all programming periods starting in 1989, the
problem arises that data on the absorptive capacity variables is only available up from
2000. After testing for their stability over time, working with their mean values from 2000
to 2013 seems to be justifiable. Moreover, Table 11 in the appendix presents estimation
results for the years 2000 to 2013 using the average values. The treatment effect and
20Thereby, some observations are lost for which no data for 2000 is available. For R&D expenditure, data
is not provided for each year for each region (with different time intervals), therefore, the first observation
per programming period is used as pre-treatment value. As this variable is highly correlated over time
(Spearman coefficient 0.961), this procedure should not bias results.
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influence of the crisis period are shown to be robust in this specification.21
Beside the productive share of the high educated labour force and R&D expenditure, as
suggested by literature, the institutional quality of a region is examined. The European
Quality of Government Index 2013 (EQI 2013) is applied and interacted with the cor-
ruption perception index (CPI) by Transparency International that is created based on
perceptions of the degree of corruption in the public administration of a country. The Eu-
ropean Quality of Government Index 2013 (introduced by Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente
2015) builds on three main characteristics, namely, corruption, quality and impartiality
of the public system. Among the considered areas are the educational system, the health
sector, media, elections or rule of law. The EQI 2013 builds on regional survey data on
the population’s perception of the quality of public services, while CPI data is collected
by different (also international) institutions (Transparency International 2012). The EQI
2013 is provided as a cross-section on the regional level, whereas the CPI is provided on
a yearly basis since 2000 for most countries on the national level. The reasons for inter-
acting these two indicators are twofold: Firstly, for the research question of this study,
corruption is expected to be a major indicator for institutional quality in terms of project
organization and allocation to different companies. Secondly, the CPI is only available on
the national level but for a time series from 2000 to 2011, whereas the EQI 2013 covers
the regional level. Thus, interacting these two indicators enables analyzing both the time
and regional dimension.22
For the subsequent analysis, it is of interest to know whether the means of the absorptive
capacity variables are different from each other in the treatment and control (non-treated)
group. Table 3 compares them for the actually treated and non-treated regions, i.e., those
who have received payments.23 It turns out for all interaction terms that they are sig-
nificantly different from each other across treatment and control group. Hence, they are
likely to influence regional GDP per capita and the local average treatment effect. Look-
ing at the differences between coefficients that represent the extent of heterogeneity in the
21Also Becker et al. (2013) have tackled the issue in that way. The Spearman correlation coefficient of the
productive (employed) share of the labour force with upper secondary and higher education (employment
rate times the education share) in 2000 and 2013 turns out to be significant and amounts to 0.894. Alike,
the regional institutional quality measure in these years is strongly correlated and, thus, seems to be
stable (0.940). Turning to R&D expenditure in a region, the correlation coefficient between (the mean of)
observations before and after 2009 equals 0.961. Note that data on R&D expenditure, as a percentage
of GDP, of private companies, the public sector, universities and private nonprofit organizations for
some regions is only available up from 2009 and with different frequency. Therefore, the correlation is
calculated in that way. Still, the correlation between R&D expenditure as a fraction of GDP between
2000 and 2013 amounts to 0.853 for regions with both observations. Thus, after having controlled the
stability of the regional characteristics, the averages of all interaction terms are taken into account for
analyzing all MFFs up from 1989.
22For the average term used in the estimation of treatment effects from 1989 to 2013, we only consider
the CPI data from 2000 to 2011 as the index creation procedure has changed thereafter, not allowing
comparisons across years anymore.
23In order to allow more detailed insights, the productive share of the highly educated labour force is split
into their components, the share of labour force with upper secondary and higher education (USEC) and
their employment rate (EMPLR OF USEC).
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respective variable across treated and non-treated regions in a programming period, there
seems to be a convergent development until 2000-2006 as differences decrease. However,
in the crisis period, this trend appears to continue only for education levels, while the
treatment and control group (relatively weaker vs. stronger regions in terms of GDP per
capita) diverge again in terms of employment rate of the labour force with high education
as well as R&D expenditure and the institutional quality measure.
For further investigation of the heterogeneity of regions in terms of the forcing and ab-
sorptive capacity variables, Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the period considered
in the baseline regressions (2000-2013). There appears to be high variation in the employ-
ment rate of people with upper secondary and higher education, R&D expenditure and
the institutional quality measure. To give an example, the productive share of the regional
population between 25 and 64 years old with high education varies from the minimum of
13.08 % in a year between 2000 and 2013 to a maximum value of over 80 %.
Table 3: Comparison of means of interaction variables (regional averages) between treated
and non-treated regions
Actual payments (2000-2013) and EU Regulations (1989-1999)
Mean Ti = 1 Mean Ti = 0 Difference Obs.
USEC
1989-1993 0.474 0.710 0.236∗∗∗ 890
1994-1999 0.559 0.725 0.166∗∗∗ 1248
2000-2006 0.687 0.722 0.035∗∗∗ 1750
2007-2013 0.694 0.713 0.019∗∗ 1750
2000-2013 0.690 0.717 0.027∗∗∗ 3500
EMPLR of USEC
1989-1993 0.722 0.780 0.058∗∗∗ 890
1994-1999 0.728 0.784 0.056∗∗∗ 1248
2000-2006 0.731 0.783 0.053∗∗∗ 1750
2007-2013 0.722 0.780 0.058∗∗∗ 1750
2000-2013 0.727 0.782 0.055∗∗∗ 3500
R&D
1989-1993 0.686 1.779 1.093∗∗∗ 880
1994-1999 0.974 1.896 0.922∗∗∗ 1236
2000-2006 0.994 1.868 0.874∗∗∗ 1736
2007-2013 0.770 1.858 1.087∗∗∗ 1736
2000-2013 0.896 1.862 0.966∗∗∗ 3472
EQICPI
1989-1993 14.645 28.816 14.171∗∗∗ 880
1994-1999 18.355 30.060 11.705∗∗∗ 1230
2000-2006 18.064 29.193 11.128∗∗∗ 1729
2007-2013 15.194 29.035 13.841∗∗∗ 1729
2000-2013 16.810 29.108 12.298∗∗∗ 3458
Data: Cambridge Econometrics (transformed to NUTS-2010 classification), DG Regional Policy, EU Commission. The four French
overseas departments and two Portuguese regions, Acores and Madeira, are not included in the dataset. For comparison of means of
interaction variables among treatment and control group before and after 2000, a regional average of these means is used. USEC
represents the share of the labour force with upper and secondary education, EMPLR of USEC the share of USEC that is employed,
R&D the regional R&D expenditure as fraction of GDP, and EQICPI denominates the institutional quality variable. EQICPI ranges
from 0 to 60 (highest institutional quality and lowest corruption).
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs.
Reg. avg. GDP pc relative to EU-25 average 1.000 0.465 0.150 3.580 3500
2000-2013
Regional productive population with 53.314 12.675 13.083 80.339 3396
ISCED >= 3 (/%)
Reg. share of population with ISCED >= 3 (%) 70.173 15.775 15.592 97.049 3442
Reg. employment rate of ISCED >= 3 (%) 76.077 6.256 35.116 98.639 3396
Reg. average CPI(avg.) x EQI 2013 24.552 10.451 3.625 54.970 3458
National avg. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 6.862 1.670 4.167 9.508 3500
Regional EQI 2013 3.412 0.808 0.758 5.781 3458
Reg. avg. R&D expenditure / GDP (%) 1.498 1.189 0.099 7.909 3472
Data: Cambridge Econometrics (transformed to NUTS-2010 classification), Eurostat, Transparency International, Charron, Dijkstra
and Lapuente (2014). EQI is rescaled to range from 0 to 6 (best institutional quality), EQICPI ranges from 0 to 60. Sample
2000-2006 and 2007-2013: Averages of interaction variables are calculated for EU-25 (250 NUTS-2 regions), from 2000-2013
(employment rates per education level), 2000-2011 (CPI) and 2000-2013, respectively (R&D expenditure relative to GDP). The four
French overseas departments and the two Portuguese regions Acores and Madeira are not included in the dataset. 58 observations of
the education variable and 104 observations of the employment rate are missing. For two German regions, employment data is only
available up from 2011, for the five Danish regions data on education and employment is missing before 2007. EQI2013: Data is
missing for two Spanish regions (Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta and Ciudad Autónoma de Mellila) and one Finnish region
(Helsinki-Uusimaa). R&D expenditure: Data for two German regions (Niederbayern and Oberpfalz) is missing.
4 The Heterogeneous Local Average Treatment Effects
(HLATE) Estimation Framework
Having introduced all components, i.e., the forcing and outcome variable as well as the
interaction terms (absorptive capacity variables), of the estimation model in the last sec-
tion, the following three equations show the estimation model (notation is according to
Angrist and Pischke 2009 and Becker et al. 2013):
yi = α+ f0(x˜i) + z¯i +Di[ρ+ f∗1 (x˜i) + z¯i] + i (2)
with
Di = P (Di = 1|xi) = E[Di|xi] = γ + f0(x˜i) + Ti[pi + f∗1 (x˜i)] + z¯i (3)
where
Ti = 1(xi ≤ x0)
where yi denotes the regional average GDP per capita growth from 2000 to 2006 and 2007
to 2012, respectively, subscript 1 indicates treatment and 0 stands for non-treatment.
x˜i = xi−x0 denotes the forcing variable (GDP per capita in threshold years as deviation
from 75 % of the EU-25 average), z¯i = zi − zsmean the vector of interaction variables
in terms of deviation from the respective sample mean. f0(x˜i), and f∗1 (x˜i) are polyno-
mial functions of the forcing variable that have to be sufficiently smooth to capture the
treatment effect at the threshold. Figure 5 shows that the outcome as a function of the
forcing variable is not a linear function and different on both sides of the threshold, that
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is why the forcing variable enters the model as separate and interaction term (with the
treatment).24 In line with Lee and Lemieux (2010) the same number of polynomials is
considered in the first and second stage estimation.
Figure 5: Regional average GDP per capita growth in treated and non-treated regions, both
MFFs 2000-2006 and 2007-2013
Data source: Eurostat. Data are in 1.5 % bins, line is quadratic of best fit. NUTS-2 regions of EU-25 from 2000 to 2013. Due to
data limitations, the four French overseas-departments and two Portuguese regions (Acores and Madeira) are skipped.
As we estimate a fuzzy RDD, in which also regions that receive convergence funds but do
not comply with the eligibility criterion set by the European Commission are considered,
the treatment rule Ti = 1(xi ≤ x0) serves as an instrument for the treatment probability
Di.25 In other words, the probability of being treated is discontinuous (jumps) at the 75 %
threshold of the forcing variable (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009).
The local average treatment effect (LATE) of the convergence funds allocation on the
outcome yi (average GDP per capita growth over the programming periods 2000-2006 and
2007-2013) is measured by ρ while the polynomials of the forcing variable serve as controls
for the functional form. In order to assess the sensitivity of results, a second-, third- and
fourth-order polynomial specification of the forcing variable is estimated. Heterogeneity of
the LATE comes in via the absorptive capacity variables, separately and interacted with
the treatment indicator. For estimating time-varying treatment effects, the instrumented
treatment Di is as well interacted with dummies representing the programming periods.
Moreover, when taking into account the share of committed funds that has been paid out
(also modeled as deviation from the sample mean) as treatment intensity, the treatment
24Note that the jump at the threshold of 75 % indicates a negative, unconditional treatment effect of
convergence funds from 2000 to 2013.
25The treatment rule (Equation 1) implies heterogeneity of the units before treatment, i.e., the assignment
of convergence funds is not random but depends on the regions’ average GDP per capita during a certain
period. See Brand and Thomas 2013 for a discussion of the different types of heterogeneity in the
treatment effects estimation framework.
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indicator is multiplied by this share. In further specifications, country-, time- and regional
fixed effects as well as, for a robustness check, a dummy for the ten European member
states entering the EU in 2004 and other controls are added.
5 Data
The sample is based on 250 NUTS-2 regions in the EU-25, excluding Bulgaria, Romania
and Croatia. Due to data limitations, the four French overseas-departments as well as two
Portuguese regions (Acores and Madeira) are excluded. For the treatment eligibility, i.e.,
the forcing variable GDP per capita in the relevant years for each funding period, 2000-
2002 (EU-25; for MFF 2007-2013), 1994-1996 (EU-25; for MFF 2000-2006), 1988-1990
(EU-15; for MFF 1994-1999) and 1984-1986 (EU-12; for MFF 1989-1993), respectively,
data on GDP and population from Cambridge Econometrics is adopted.26 The same data
source determines the outcome variable, namely, regional average GDP per capita growth
over each multi-annual financial framework (2007-2012 for the latest, as data is not avail-
able yet for 2013).
In order to see which regions are complying with the treatment rule, that is, regions whose
GDP per capita lies above 75 % of the EU-average and that do not receive convergence
(or Objective 1) funds and vice versa, we investigate structural funds expenditure data
that is available for 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. For the two previous MFFs 1989-1993
and 1994-1999, lists of eligible regions in EU regulations are taken as a basis (European
Council 1993, 1988).27 Regarding the MFF 2007-2013, data on the operational programs
under the convergence objective that have actually been financed per region is employed,
available on the website of the European Commission’s DG Regional Policy, are consid-
ered as indicator for actual treatment in a region (European Commission 2015a,b). For
2000-2006, the DG Regional Policy provides a regional expenditure study (SWECO 2008)
and we consider a region as treated if there is a corresponding expenditure reported under
Objective 1. Treatment intensity data, i.e., the shares of initially committed funds paid
out, are taken from European Commission (2016a).
For the interaction variables, information on the regional distribution of the highest at-
tained level of education of the population between 25 and 64 years and regional employ-
ment rates per education level for the workforce aged between 25 and 64 years is taken
from Eurostat. These two variables are multiplied in order to get the productive share
of the population with upper secondary and higher education (PRODUSEC). As already
26In order to be comparable with further data sources, they are transformed to the NUTS-2010 classification
of European regions. Refer to European Council (1988, 1993, 1999, 2006) and DG REGIO regarding the
respective threshold years per programming period.
27Note that eight Eastern German regions that became part of the EU in 1990 after the German reunifi-
cation are treated as missing values in 1989-1993.
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indicated above, education is measured according to the International Standard Classi-
fication of Education (ISCED 2011) by UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).28 More-
over, data on regional R&D expenditure in all sectors as a percentage of GDP (R&D)
from 2000 to 2013 is taken from Eurostat.29 Finally, the variable measuring institutional
quality (EQICPI) is based on the corruption perception index (CPI) by Transparency
International (available, in a comparable way for 2000-2011) and the European Quality of
Government Index 2013 (EQI2013) by Charron et al. (2015). The newly created index is
transformed to range from 0 to 60, the latter indicating highest institutional quality and
lowest corruption.
6 Estimation Results
To start, Table 5 presents the parametric and non-parametric estimation results for the
homogeneous LATE for 2000 to 2013, i.e., without considering heterogeneity across re-
gions. The picture in Figure 5 which points to a negative treatment effect, as well as in
Figures 6 and 7 that indicate the deterioration of the effectiveness in the second period,
is mirrored by the negative or non-significant treatment effect and the robust negative
impact of the crisis period. However, note that the figures and non-parametric estimation
results do not consider any heterogeneity across observations, while in the parametric es-
timations it is only controlled for time and country-fixed effects. What sticks out is that
when including the latter (refer to the second column of each specification in Table 5),
the coefficient of the treatment effect turns positive in all specifications with a different
number of polynomials considered.
However, one can expect that structural characteristics of the region and treatment inten-
sity (amount of funds used in projects) matter for the effectiveness of EU regional policy.
In the next step, the model is augmented by the absorptive capacity variables and shares
of committed funds paid out, and the HLATE is estimated following Equation 2.
28We refer to upper and secondary and higher education as ISCED levels 3-8. Level 0: Early childhood
educational development, pre-primary education; Level 1: Primary education; Level 2: Lower secondary
education (general, vocational); Level 3: Upper secondary education (general, vocational); Level 4: Post-
secondary non-tertiary education (general, vocational); Level 5: Short-cycle tertiary education (general,
vocational); Level 6: Bachelor’s or equivalent level; Level 7: Master’s or equivalent level; Level 8: Doctor
or equivalent level.
29Note that there are missing data points for different years across regions.
20
Table 5: Homogeneous Local Average Treatment Effect of convergence funds on GDP per
capita growth across programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 (excl. five
treated regions with a forcing variable >= 1.25)
Second-order polynomial Third-order polynomial Fourth-order polynomial
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Non-parametric −0.011 −0.026∗∗ −0.027∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Parametric
Treatment −0.008 0.005 −0.002 0.006 0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
MFF 2007-2013 −0.024∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.011 0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
Country FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
Adjusted R2 0.450 0.587 0.466 0.588 0.427 0.494
Notes: Fuzzy regression discontinuity design, non-parametric (conventional structural estimate)
and 2-stage least squares estimation with probit in first stage (incl. interactions of polynomials of
forcing variable with treatment). *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at
the 10% level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at regional level. Dependent outcome
variable: regional average GDP per capita growth per programming period, i.e., 2000-2006 and
2007-2012 (data for 2013 is not available). Treatment is determined by the forcing variable x˜,
i.e., regional average GDP per capita 1994-1996 and 2000-2002, respectively, as deviation from the
75 % EU-25 average. Sample: 250 NUTS-2 regions in EU-25.
Figure 6: Regional average GDP per capita growth in treated and non-treated regions
2000-2006
Data source: Eurostat. Data are in 1.5 % bins, line is quadratic of best fit. NUTS-2 regions of EU-25 from 2000 to 2013. Due to
data limitations (employment rate per education level, which is one main variable of interest), the four French overseas-departments
and two Portuguese regions (Acores and Madeira) are excluded from the sample. Outliers are included in this graph.
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Figure 7: Regional average GDP per capita growth in treated and non-treated regions
2007-2013
Data source: Eurostat. Data are in 1.5 % bins, line is quadratic of best fit. NUTS-2 regions of EU-25 from 2000 to 2013. Due to
data limitations (employment rate per education level, which is one main variable of interest), the 4 French overseas-departments
and two Portuguese regions (Acores and Madeira) are excluded from the sample.
6.1 Turning to the Heterogeneity of the Treatment Effect
The following tables show the estimation results according to the HLATE specification
in Equation 2 for the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. The reasons for
focusing on these two periods in this paper are twofold: Firstly, it is possible to use pre-
treatment values of the variables describing absorptive capacity.30 Secondly, as the latter
results already indicate an important influence of the crisis period on the effectiveness of
regional policy, we are interested in whether the sharply decreased paid-out shares of funds
that have been committed at the beginning of the programming period in 2007-2013 af-
fect the treatment effect. This parts of funds actually used are only available up from 2000.
In order to ensure robustness of the results, second- to fourth-order polynomials of the
vectors of the forcing variable (regional GDP per capita in threshold years in terms of devi-
ation from the 75 % EU-25 average). Additionally, estimations are done using country- and
regional fixed effects (FE) and as well as time-specific fixed effects which should account for
the economic recession up from 2008. A fuzzy RDD is estimated taking into account 250
European NUTS-2 regions. Remember that five observations which are treated although
having a GDP per capita in the corresponding threshold years equal to or higher than 1.25
times the EU average (in 2000-2006) are excluded. Moreover, 38 observations are left out
30As mentioned above, when including all programming periods into the analysis, it is necessary to use
average values the absorptive capacity variables across 2000-2013 (or 2000-2011 in the case of CPI).
Table 11 in the appendix shows the regression analysis of the latest two periods when using not pre-
treatment but average values. An apparent difference in results concerns the productive share of the
labour force with upper secondary and higher education (PRODUSEC) which becomes positive and
significant in most specifications. The local average treatment effect appears to be significant and slightly
higher. Moreover, the negative effect of the crisis period is evident. The results are robust to including
regional fixed effects.
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due to missing pre-treatment values. Thus, 457 observations remain in the baseline sample.
Table 6 shows that, conditional on the variables representing regional absorptive capacity
and country dummies, the treatment effect across 2000-2013 turns out positive. Though,
its significance varies across the specifications with different polynomial fits of the forcing
variable. This result holds when including a dummy representing the crisis period which
is shown to be negative and significant throughout the large majority of estimated mod-
els. Another robust finding is the positive effect of better institutional quality (and lower
corruption) on the outcome variable. This result is in line with Rodríguez-Pose (2013)
and Hagen and Mohl (2009) who find that, on the national level, cohesion policy seems
to be effective only conditional on institutional quality. However, when including NUTS-2
region-specific fixed effects standard errors increase strongly leaving no variable with an
significant impact. This may be the case as these fixed effects take away much of regional
variation.31
In the third column of Table 6, the model allowing for a time-varying treatment effect
is presented. The crisis period 2007-2013 appears to have a significant impact on GDP
per capita growth not only as a separate explanatory variable but also in interaction
with the treatment. This indicates that the effectiveness of convergence funds assignment
decreases in the programming period 2007-2013 relative to the previous one. Table 10
in the appendix contains analogous results for all programming periods up from 1989,
revealing that the effectiveness of convergence funds has stayed constant in former periods
but deteriorated significantly in the last one.
6.1.1 Robustness Checks
Table 7 comprises several robustness checks controlling for issues that could bias the re-
sults. In general, one can conclude that the positive (and significant) treatment effect and
the negative impact of the crisis period on regional GDP per capita growth is robust.32
One potential issue is that in 2000-2006, the eligibility status of the EU-15 regions has
been determined considering the EU-15 average while in 2004 ten new member states en-
tered the EU putting downward pressure on the EU average GDP per capita. However,
for the baseline results in this paper, we consider the EU-25 average for the treatment rule
as in the MFF 2000-2006 also the Eastern European regions have received convergence
funds. That is, many non-compliers with the treatment rule in that programming period
arise from this issue. In order to control for this, first, a sharp RDD is calculated, i.e., the
regions that do not comply with the treatment rule are eliminated. By that, also regions
in phasing-out phases of their previous convergence funds programs are excluded from
31Moreover, 82.7 % of the regions have the same treatment status in 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. Note that
the impact of the crisis period and the coefficient of the treatment effect in Table 11, when considering
average values of the absorptive capacity variables, are robust to the inclusion of regional fixed effects.
32The first column, BASE, for the second-order and third-order polynomial specifications shows the model
with the time-varying treatment effect from Table 6.
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the analysis. Second, a dummy representing the new Eastern European member states
is added to the baseline regression in the first and second estimation stage. Third, the
fourth column shows results when the new member states are excluded from the analysis
and the GDP per capita average of the EU-15 is considered as forcing variable for 2000-
2006 (EU15&2TRs).
Focusing on a second potential source of bias, testing for spatial autocorrelation of the
error terms resulting from the baseline regressions (per programming period, second-order
polynomial fit) reveals a slightly positive and significant Moran’s I when country dummies
are not considered, thus, indicating spatial dependence. However, when taking into ac-
count country-fixed effects, Moran’s I becomes insignificant which may provide evidence
that the spatial dependence does not bias estimation results.33 Furthermore, as another
way to check this, in the model presented in the fifth column (per polynomial specification)
of Table 7, spatial lags of the polynomial terms of the forcing variables are included in the
first and second stage estimation. These spatial lags are calculated using a spatial weights
matrix built on inverse distance between regions for the programming period 2000-2006
and 2007-2013 each. Without putting too much emphasis on this result (as the spatial
analysis should just serve as an robustness check), it is interesting that when including
the spatial lags of the forcing variable, the coefficient of the local average treatment effect
increases. Investigating this relationship further remains for future research.34
6.2 Treatment Intensity
The previous exercises have revealed that the crisis period is crucial for the success of
convergence funds. Therefore, it is of interest examining possible determinants of this is-
sue. As discussed in Section 2.2, not all committed funds (at the beginning of the budget
period) are actually paid out to the regions. It seems to be a common trend that, in the
budget period coinciding with the outbreak of the economic crisis, 2007-2013, shares paid
out declined notably compared to the previous period. In the next step, we investigate
whether there is a correlation with the regional policy outcome. For that, the treatment
indicator is supplemented by the shares of committed funds actually used as treatment
intensity (Treat x PAIDOUT).
Table 8 shows corresponding results, with all specifications using second- to fourth-order
polynomials including time- and country-fixed effects. Considering region-fixed effects (in
33A spatial weights matrix based on five nearest neighbours and inverse distance is taken into account
each. To be precise, for the second-order polynomial fit with country-fixed effects, when considering the
five nearest neighbours, for 2007-2013, Moran’s I amounts to 0.06 and is significant at the 10 % level.
Using weights that build on inverse distance, the test shows no spatial autocorrelation of the forcing
variable determining treatment in this programming period. The same holds true when the Moran’s I
is calculated for the error terms of the estimation including treatment intensity where there seems to be
no spatial dependence with both spatial weight matrices.
34Beside others, Dall’Erba and Le Gallo (2008) have evaluated regional policy using spatial econometric
methods.
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column FE) again raises standard errors, likely to capture much of regional variation also
pictured by other variables. However, the coefficients appear to be robust. Interestingly,
considering a simple linear function of the share of committed funds actually used (as
deviation from the respective sample mean) does not show any effect on regional GDP
per capita growth, however, when furthermore taking its quadratic term into account,
both related coefficients turn significant. The signs of the coefficients of the linear and
the quadratic term point to an inverted U-shaped relationship, i.e., higher regional policy
transfers aimed at convergence appear to improve regional policy performance only until
a certain point. This suggests that the effect of an additional Euro of convergence funds
paid out on regional GDP per capita growth decreases with the amount already spent,
even in a period of economic downturn with a significant negative impact on regional pol-
icy effectiveness. This interesting finding is in line with Becker, Egger and Von Ehrlich
(2012) who provide maximum desirable levels of structural funds to a region and find
that in 18 % of European regions reduced funds allocation would not hamper economic
growth. Moreover, this result indicates that making more funds accessible (in crisis) does
not necessarily help fostering GDP per capita growth. Instead, estimation results show
that improving institutional quality is robustly associated with a better outcome.
Finally, the third column of Table 8 (per polynomial specification), by allowing for time-
varying treatment intensity, shows whether a higher share paid out in the crisis period
affects the success of convergence funds. A greater fraction (which could imply that the
region is relatively more able to cope with the consequences of economic downturn) seems
to dampen (Treat x PAIDOUT x 2007-2013) the negative relation between funds paid
out and regional GDP per capita growth (Treat x 2007-2013) during the programming
period. However, significance is not robust across the polynomial specifications of the
forcing variable shown in the table.
6.2.1 Treatment Intensity: Robustness Checks
Table 9 presents the robustness checks already described in the previous section, with
reference to the specification (BASE) in which the inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween the share of committed funds paid out and regional GDP per capita growth per
programming period got visible (column (3) each in Table 8). When taking into account
the potential interference factors, apart from the restriction of the dataset to the EU-15
countries (EU15 & 2 Treatment Rules), the results confirm the found picture.
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7 Conclusion
In this study, a fuzzy regression discontinuity design allowing for heterogeneous treatment
effects is applied for empirically investigating the effectiveness of EU convergence funds
payments. Thereby, first, a concept of absorptive capacity based on the design of regional
policy is taken into account, which does not only consider education levels in a region
but the productive share of the labour force with upper secondary and higher education.
Secondly, a focus is put on the variation of the local average treatment effect over time.
Up to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that has empirically analyzed the impli-
cations of the complete programming period 2007-2013, that coincides with the economic
and financial crisis, on the effectiveness of convergence funds in a pan-European setting.
Conditional on the absorptive capacity of a region as well as country- and time-specific
effects, the estimation results indicate a positive (and significant) treatment effect on re-
gional average GDP per capita growth across the programming periods. We find that
better institutional quality (and lower corruption) has an important positive impact on
GDP per capita growth in treated regions. Estimating time-varying treatment effects re-
veals that the effectiveness of structural funds aimed at convergence appears to deteriorate
in the programming period 2007-2013. Therefore, in the next step, we have examined the
impact of decreased usage of committed funds in the crisis period and estimated a model
based on treatment intensity. The results indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship with
regional GDP per capita growth, implying that the marginal benefits of EU convergence
funds might be decreasing (even when considering the crisis period with a significant neg-
ative impact on regional policy effectiveness).
The latter results may contribute to the discussion of the design of regional policy for
the case of economic crises. As one of the first reactions to the deterioration of the
economic situation in the lagging regions, the European Commission facilitated access to
the regional funds in 2010 (see Section 2.3). While this is an intuitively appealing policy
response, the results presented in this paper indicate that a higher amount of funding does
not necessarily improve the effectiveness of convergence funds payments. Indeed, results
suggest that the effect of a higher share of convergence funds paid out turns even negative
at some point. However, another finding is that regional institutional quality has a positive
impact on GDP per capita growth, both in regions that receive convergence funds and
those that do not. These may be two relevant points to be discussed when revisiting the
current allocation system of regional funds to projects (including the co-financing scheme)
in order to mitigate the empirically observed pro-cyclical effects of EU structural funds
payments in the relatively weakest regions of the European Union.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Assumptions for Estimating the Heterogeneous Local Average Treat-
ment Effect (HLATE)
In this study, a HLATE specification is applied for testing whether the treatment with
convergence funds increases the average GDP per capita growth of a region across pro-
gramming periods, and whether the interaction variables, assumed to depict the absorptive
capacity of the regions, or the respective programming period influence this local average
treatment effect. Following Becker et al. (2013) in stating three important assumptions
of RDD estimation, firstly, one main assumption for identification of a RDD is that there
is no discontinuity in any other explanatory variable (of the outcome) than in the forcing
variable that splits observations into treatment and control group. Secondly, the inter-
action variables used for modeling the heterogeneity of the treatment effect must not be
discontinuous at the 75 % threshold of the forcing variable, thus, not affecting the local
average treatment effect. In the following tables the pre-treatment values of the absorp-
tive capacity variables are plotted on the forcing variables for the programming periods
2000-2006 (average of GDP per capita in years 1994-1996 is relevant for eligibility) and
2007-2013 (average of GDP per capita in years 2000-2002).35 Thirdly, the error term in
Equation 2 needs to be uncorrelated with the vectors of interaction variables z¯ conditional
on the forcing variable, which is controlled for by using country- and region-fixed effects
or estimating the model with average values of the absorptive capacity variables.
Figure 8: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita from 1994 to 1996) and the pre-treatment value (2000, 2006) of regional
average employed labour force with upper secondary and higher education in
terms of squared deviation from the sample mean
35The graphs plotting the average variables of absorptive capacity that are applied when estimating the
HLATE for all periods, starting from 1989, are not depicted in this paper but show an analogical
relationship (the graphs are available from the author).
35
Figure 9: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita from 2000 to 2002) and the pre-treatment value (2000, 2006) of regional
average employed labour force with upper secondary and higher education in
terms of squared deviation from the sample mean
Figures 8 and 9 considering 250 regions 2000-2013 (EU-25). Education data missing in 13 regions (58
observations) for 2000-2006: Denmark (5: 2000-2006), Slovenia (2: 2000), Germany (3: 2000,2001), Italy
(1: 2000-2004), Finland (2: 2000-2004). Additionally, 46 observations of the employment rate of people
with ISCED levels equal or over 3 are missing: Germany (2: 2000-2010), Finland (1: 2000-2004), Italy (1:
2000-2004), UK (2: 2000-2004). Data: Cambridge Econometrics, Eurostat.
Figure 10: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita from 1994 to 1996) and the pre-treatment value (2000, 2006) of the
regional average of EQI 2013 x CPI in terms of squared deviation from the
sample mean
Figure considering 250 regions from 2000 to 2011 (EU-25; CPI not available for Malta in the years 2000
to 2003 and for Cyprus from 2000 to 2002; EQI2013 not available for two Spanish regions and one
Finnish region). Data: Charron et al. (2015), Transparency International.
36
Figure 11: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita from 2000 to 2002) and the pre-treatment value (2000, 2006) of the
regional average of EQI 2013 x CPI in terms of squared deviation from the
sample mean
Figure considering 250 regions from 2000 to 2011 (EU-25; CPI not available for Malta in the years 2000
to 2003 and for Cyprus from 2000 to 2002; EQI2013 not available for two Spanish regions and one
Finnish region). Data: Charron et al. (2015), Transparency International.
Figure 12: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita from 1994 to 1996) and the pre-treatment (earliest available) R&D
expenditure relative to GDP in terms of squared deviation from the sample mean
Figure considering 250 regions (EU-25; data is not annually or regularly available for most regions; not
available for two German regions in Bavaria; additionally, no data before 2007 for two further German
regions, five Danish, two Finnish and two UK regions). Data: Eurostat.
37
Figure 13: Relationship between forcing variable (75 % of the EU-25 average of GDP per
capita from 2000 to 2002) and the pre-treatment (earliest available) R&D
expenditure relative to GDP in terms of squared deviation from the sample mean
Figure considering 250 regions (EU-25; data is not annually or regularly available for most regions; not
available for two German regions in Bavaria; additionally, no data before 2007 for two further German
regions, five Danish, two Finnish and two UK regions). Data: Eurostat.
8.2 Time-varying Treatment Effects 1989-1993 to 2007-2013
Table 10 shows the treatment effect for all four programming periods from 1989-1993 on.
The effectiveness measured by the LATE is not only allowed to vary with the absorptive
capacity variables but also with time, i.e., the respective programming period (Treat x
1994-1999, Treat x 2000-2006, Treat x 2007-2013). For all specifications including the
estimation with regional fixed effects, the effectiveness of convergence funds is shown to
decrease in the crisis period, 2007-2013, relative to previous periods in which the effective-
ness has stayed constant, i.e., has not improved or worsened significantly.
Table 11 reports the estimation results for the MFFs 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 using
average absorptive capacity variables.
8.3 Robustness
Table 12 shows different adaptations of the RDD specification, i) the HLATE estimation
without polynomials of the forcing variable but only the linear term, ii) the same linear and
a second-order polynomial specification for a reduced sample around the 75 % threshold of
EU-25 average GDP per capita, iii) the HLATE estimation with the linear forcing variable
for an even closer window around the threshold determining treatment (60 % to 90 % of
EU-25 average GDP per capita). Finally, as one could argue that considering only two
periods in a panel setting may bias the estimation, results for the separate periods are
reported utilizing the same first stage estimation.
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